There is a growing literature on the differential impact of "soft" vs. "hard" information on organizational structure and behavior. Most empirical papers on soft information study the financial intermediation industry. This is one of the few papers that measure the impact of soft information in a different industry, namely, on sales of "spec" (unsolicited) screenplays. In our empirical analysis, we find that "hard information" (measurable experience) variables as well as "soft information" proxies, such as descriptive complexity, are priced. Screenplays with high soft information content are priced lower than "harder information"-type scripts. This is especially true for less experienced writers. We also find that large studios shun soft information, as predicted by most theories. This paper is also one of the few studies that analyze empirical contract design. We show that soft information and screenwriter reputation will affect the type of contracts offered, suggesting that contingent contracts may work when uncertainty and asymmetric information interact. We also find that large firms tend to offer more contingent contracts and pay a premium for hard information, similar to the findings in the banking literature. In the last part of the paper we follow some of the screenplays to production, and find that buyers seem to be able to forecast the success of a script, paying more for screenplays resulting in more successful films. In other words, harder information screenplays sell for more and result in more successful movies.
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The Role of Soft and Hard Information in the Pricing of Assets and Contract Design --Evidence from Screenplay Sales I I. . I IN NT TR RO OD DU UC CT TI IO ON N
This paper uses a unique data set on screenplay sales to gain insight into three questions. First, this is one of very few papers, outside the financial intermediation industry, which shows how soft information affects asset pricing and how it is processed in different types of organizations. Second, we look at empirical contract design in a setting of pure risk sharing and information asymmetries, with no effort component. Third, we can compare ex-ante pricing of screenplays to ex-post performance of resulting movies, an experiment which is difficult to perform in other industries.
Practically all assets, enterprises and transactions are evaluated on the basis of both "soft" and "hard" information. Considerable research --as well as testimony from the experience of market participants --suggests that numbers do not completely capture the nuances of such things as counterparty risk, manager reputation and the potential for success. However, most of the existing literature on the impact of soft information has focused on the financial services industry, a setting in which there is considerable numerical information about assets and where one might expect only limited deviation from reliance on quantitative models. (See Petersen, 2004 , for an insightful survey.) As a consequence, studies of soft information treat it as the residual in an estimation model, or capture its effects through indirect proxies such as distance. In this paper we use our unique data set to provide more direct evidence of how soft information is viewed compared to hard information in pricing of assets. Importantly, since scripts are purchased by different types of organizations, we can also shed some light on how different types of organizations process soft information.
There is a huge theoretical literature on contract design. However, there is much less empirical evidence on the principles developed in the theories. Most of these papers are on venture capital contracts and on the bio-medical industries. 2 In this paper, we analyze the types of agents and types of projects that tend to receive contingent contracts.
We also complement a new and innovative study by Eliashberg et al. (2007) by correlating the success of movies with the prices paid for screenplays at the point of sale. Very seldom does one have evidence of a market-based assessment of the ex-ante value of an individual project, and we can use this information to validate the other parts of the paper and to see whether prices paid in the inception stage are rational.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related literature. Section III focuses on soft information within the film industry and contains our empirical predictions. Section IV describes the institutional background, the data and research design. We proceed with results (section V) and conclusions.
I II I. . R RE EL LA AT TE ED D L LI IT TE ER RA AT TU UR RE E
The closest paper to ours, and the only work to our knowledge to address screenplay pricing, is Eliashberg et al. (2007) . Eliashberg et al. (2007) use what they call semantics, namely, numerical measures of a text, as well as the "bag-of-words" methodology, to dissect the "spoiler", i.e. a detailed movie description. This analysis creates predictors for the return on investment for the movie (US box office / budget). We use measures similar to semantics to analyze the pitch which had led to the sale. We have much shorter texts (our average pitch includes 26 words whereas the average "spoiler" include 1642 words) 3 but we have many more screenplays. Also, of course, our focus is on the actual sale and not the return on subsequent investment, although we do discuss the eventual movie projects as well.
Our paper is mainly related to the soft information literature in finance and management. The theoretical literature in this area focuses on the impact of soft information on organizational structure, and most of the empirical testing considers the financial services sector. Stein (2002) suggests that in the presence of soft information, decentralization can allow good projects to be funded properly by providing the correct incentives to division managers who can engage in research. He defines "soft information" as information that can be directly verified only by the agent who produces it, and cannot be unambiguously documented. Important applications of the concept of soft information focus on the financial intermediation industry. Petersen (2004) suggests that soft information has been in the background, but not necessarily the foreground, of various theoretical papers, including the ones we have mentioned. His survey also discusses empirical work, suggesting that small banks may be more comfortable with soft information, whereas larger banks process harder information better. Empirical tests show that firms that are less informationally transparent have a lower probability of loan approval. Further, such firms tend to do better with smaller banks that can better evaluate soft information. A paper which forms the basis for some of these observations is Petersen and Rajan (2002) . The authors focus on the distance between lenders and borrowers, and obtain several interesting results. The finding which is most relevant to the current discussion is that more informationally opaque firms tend to borrow from nearby lenders.
Informational transparency is measured by the availability of a firm credit card, the availability of tax and 3 See Table 2 of Eliashberg et al. (2007) , and our data description.
income records and being a franchise 4 . The idea of distance as an indirect measure of social relations is also developed in Uzzi (1999) and Uzzi and Gillespie, (2002) . These papers, which approach the problem from a management-sociological viewpoint, seek to define the impact of "embeddedness" of banking relationships on the cost of capital and on trade credit relationships respectively. The main proxies used for closeness of relationships or "embeddedness in a social network", are the duration of the relationship, and "multiplexity", i.e. the number of business services and personal services used by the borrower. Uzzi (1999) finds that a closer relationship significantly lowers the cost of capital, and Uzzi and Gillespie (2002) find that it affects trade credit relationships 5 .
Berger et al. (2005) use a matched sample of banks and firms. They find that large banks lend in a more "impersonal" way and are less willing to deal with difficult, implicitly high soft information cases.
6 Liberti (2004) looks at a natural experiment following a change of the hierarchical structure at an Argentinean bank. He uses direct measures of soft information, and in that sense his empirical setting is close to our work. He finds that soft information variables (namely, risk assessment measures of management, measures of the competitive environment, as well as access to capital markets and other bank relationships) are significant in determining the pricing of working capital loans after the change.
In summary, "soft information" still lacks a generally accepted theoretical grounding. However, there are several theories and much testing of the impact of "soft information", defined in general intuitive terms, in the financial services industry.
Another strand of literature related to our work is empirical studies of contract design. These studies use observed contract features to test some of the ideas in the vast theoretical contract design literature. Much of the work covers the venture capital sector, where contracts are available for inspection. Gompers and Lerner (1996) consider the use of covenants in venture capital contracts. They suggest that covenants may be used instead of adjusting pricing or specifying an 80/20 contract split to reflect agency problems and supply and demand conditions in the market for venture capital. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) provide a detailed analysis of the features and dynamics of venture capital contracts.
They suggest that different features may conform to different theories of contract design. In the biotechnology industry, the focus is, again, on the distribution of various rights in the contracts (see for example, Lerner and Merges, 1998) . However, the institutional setting in most of this work is differentthese papers discuss control and effort issues in contracts relating to projects that are in progress. In our case, we consider the sale of a completed product. Thus we can focus on pure risk sharing and information asymmetries. Perhaps the closest papers to our work are Banerjee and Duflo (2000) and 4 However, a time variable turns out to be important and the authors note that "The relation between predicted distance and credit availability is weakening over time" (p. 2566) possibly indicating technological progress. 5 See also Carruthers and Cohen (2001) and Butler (2004) for other applications of soft information. 6 See Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Petersen and Rajan (2002) in addition to Berger et al. (2004) . Chisholm (1997) . Banerjee and Duflo (2000) show that better reputation (in Indian software companies) leads to a lower prevalence of fixed payment contracts, which provide more incentives to the firms rather than the "contingent" contract. Chisholm (1997) analyzes several dozen actor contracts and considers who is more likely to receive a share contract. We will compare her results to our work later on. If we put the empirical proxies in the context of the theoretical literature, we may identify the main characteristics of soft information as a high cost of transmission and different interpretation by different people. Petersen (2004, p. 5 ) also suggests that soft information "is often communicated in text."
Our main measure of soft information is the descriptive complexity of the text, namely, the number of words in the logline (abstract, pitch) . This is similar to the semantic measures use in Eliashberg et al. (2007) which turn out to be the "more relevant" in their analysis (see figure 5 ibid) 7 . Thus, our proxies do not "measure" soft information, but indicate that it is present. A more complex description implies a higher cost of transmission, as well as different interpretations by different people, i.e. "softer"
information. (This is one of the criteria separating hard and soft information cited in Petersen (2004) ).
In order to suggest why short loglines may be easier to transmit, here are two examples from our sample:
Greatest Escapes: "Several 12 year old kids escape from a camp from hell." 7 In the marketing and economics literature, textual analysis has often been used. Eliashberg et al. (2007) use the bag-of-words model as well as individual readers to extract information. Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) consider the number of characters in reviews posted for books sold on Amazon.com and BN.com as a value measure. Godes and Mayzlin (2004) find that more complicated evaluation measures are very noisy. Tetlock (2007) considers automated processing.
On any given Saturday Remembering the Titans Gives me the Varsity Blues: "Spoof of football movies." [Note that the title is longer than the logline.]
A complex description, on the other hand, makes the resulting movie harder to visualize and may be interpreted differently by different people even after they have read the screenplay. Furthermore, a complex description means that one probably has to read the screenplay in detail before a decision can be taken--which is equivalent to a high cost of transmission (the second element mentioned by Stein (2002) and also by Petersen (2004) ). Here are two examples of longer, more complex loglines from our sample:
Joe Somebody: "Corporate guy who is divorced and at the end of his rope is beaten up and humiliated by a co-worker over a parking space. He confronts his fears and in the process comes to terms with what he wants out of life and ultimately falls in love again".
Tick Tock: "Amnesiac wakes up to find that he is in FBI custody, as the prime suspect in a series of LA bombings. Without knowing whether he is really the bomber or just someone set up to look like he is, he must lead a young, female FBI agent on a desperate search through Los Angeles for the remaining explosives, before they detonate."
We also use two other measures for the presence of soft information: the number of other movies mentioned in the logline and the number of genres assigned to the screenplay. If a description specifies that the story in question is "very similar to the Godfather", most people will have a clear and similar visualization of the movie that can be made from the screenplay. Thus, when a movie is mentioned in the logline, one can say that the information is "harder". Here is an example from our sample:
Act of treason: "'In the line of Fire' meets the 'Bodyguard'."
Multiple genres indicate a "fuzzier" screenplay (e.g. a genre designation of "action/adventure/comedy" for the screenplay of "Spoils of War" as opposed to a genre designation of "comedy" for the screenplay
). A fuzzier classification may require industry participants to pay more attention to the details of the story, which makes transmission costly, and is also conducive to very different assessments of the resulting movie by different people. Consider again the "Spoils of War":
Spoils of war [genre: action adventure comedy]: "A newly found treasure map leads three soldiers to look for rewards just days before the Kuwait desert storm invasion."
It seems to us that the fuzzy selection of genres makes the screenplay much harder to visualize. (Why is this a comedy?)
Our proxies, which are indicative of "softer" screenplays, are also similar in a sense to the "embeddedness" measures that indicate a "softer" banking relationship 9 .
The other, "hard" element in the pricing and contractual design of a screenplay is the reputation of the writer. We include numbers indicating the screenwriter's experience, such as the number of films he has sold, whether or not it is his first sale, and the number and quality of awards he has received. These numerical gauges are similar to measures such as credit rating or global relationship banking used in Liberti (2004) as hard information variables, since they indicate the potential value of the film the screenplay may lead to. Our measures are also analogous to Petersen and Rajan (2002, p. 2535 We also consider the characteristics of the studios that purchase the screenplays. Stein (2002) , as well as Petersen and Rajan (2002) Berger et al. (2005) and others, suggest that more hierarchical organizations are less able to evaluate soft information and more likely to depend on hard information. This is because multi-layered firms have more difficulty transmitting soft information through the hierarchy. As in the banking literature, we use company size as a proxy for hierarchy, and thus expect larger studios to pay relatively more for "harder" screenplays everything else equal. Further, in order to better handle "softer" screenplays, large studios may offer a contingent contract. Therefore we will test the impact of studio size on screenplays sales.
IIIB. CONTINGENT CONTRACTS AND FORWARD LOOKING PRICES.
Most economists would probably expect that we should never see any contingent contracts in the spec screenplays market. The buyer (usually a studio or a production company) can be assumed to be risk neutral and the seller (usually an individual) is most probably risk averse. Since there are no effort issues (the screenplay is finished, further rewrites are paid for separately), one can expect very few contingent contracts in the presence of symmetric information regarding the uncertainty in question, in other words, we should approach "first best" à la Holmstrom (1979) . This is not the case.
A contingent contract may result if there is disagreement on the probability of production. A studio may be buying the screenplay to keep it as an out of the money option, or it may not be very clear about the chances of making it work. If we assume, in either case, that the writer is more optimistic about the prospects of the project, a contingent contract may be optimal.
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A simple example may clarify the issue. Suppose that the buyer and the seller agree that if the film is not made the screenplay will become worthless but if it is made, the value of the screenplay to the project will be $10,000. The disagreement is only on the prospects. The buyer thinks the chance of making the movie is 0.1 and the seller thinks it is 0.5. Thus, a risk neutral buyer is willing to pay only 0.1 x 10,000 = 1000 for the screenplay, whereas a risk neutral seller is willing to sell only for 0.5 x 10,000= 5000. However, the buyer is perfectly happy to pay $10,000 contingent on production, and the seller is happy to take the deal. Clearly we could work out a more realistic and elaborate example, allowing for risk aversion, but the principle is clear.
Another possible way to arrive at this disparity which translates into a contingent contract in equilibrium is to assume that the writer has better information regarding the quality of the project. This would suggest that fuzzier, softer screenplays are more likely to be sold under contingent contracts because they are harder to visualize, and further, that contingent contracts may be more likely if the writer has less of a track record 11 . Another way to look at that would be to suggest that "softer" screenplays are considered more as an option since their value is not clear, and thus are traded as such. All approaches would suggest that softer screenplays and those written by less experienced writers may be traded with contingent contracts 12 .
After we test the pricing and contract design, we will consider the impact of these properties of script pricing on the valuation of the finished product, in this case measured by revenues and rates of return of film projects. The question is whether the prices are forward looking -that is to say, whether the studio will pay more for screenplays that lead to more successful movies. This part of the paper is similar to Eliashberg et al. (2007) in the sense that we are predicting the success of a movie based on screenplay characteristics. In our paper, however, in addition to control variables regarding the movie itself, we have a market based measure of the quality of the screenplay, namely, its purchase price. While efficient markets die-hards would probably expect prices to predict the success of the project, this is not the prevailing industry belief. These beliefs were famously summarized by the very successful The process of turning an idea into a completed movie is complex and long. Not only is it difficult to get a screenplay produced, but it is even difficult to get an idea reviewed. One can register a screenplay with the Writers Guild of America (WGA); however, a writer will need an agent in order to submit a screenplay to a studio or production company. Getting an agent may not be trivial either-quite a few agencies do not accept unsolicited manuscripts, 13 and represent only people who are referred by people they know. Once a writer has representation, an agent may submit a screenplay to be evaluated by a production company. Most major studios have several layers of screening before a script ends up in the hands of someone who can make a purchase decision. WGA sets minimum prices for screenplays, which in early 2004 (somewhat later than the last sale in our dataset) were around $50,000 for a low budget movie and up to $90,000 for a high budget film. However, a purchase (which is when the screenplay appears in our data), even at a very high price, is no guarantee of production. It may still take a while for anything to happen. First, screenplays are "developed," that is, changed, re-written and adapted to both the creative and pragmatic (budget) requirements of the purchasing entity. 14 Then, even if everybody is happy with the final write-up, there may not be a studio that is willing to finance and distribute the film.
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Fundamental to the entire process is the "pitch," that is, the basic concept of the screenplay boiled down to a parsimonious narrative that can be delivered in a paragraph or two in writing or verbally by a writer, agent or another intermediary in the process. The pitch must have all of the necessary elements to explain the potential appeal of the story, without the complexities and detail of the actual script. A script with a simple pitch is characterized as a "high concept" script. The common belief in Hollywood is that a high concept script is more valuable, and easier to sell to readers and producers. 16 This presents a challenge to our analysis. Absent such common knowledge, the description length would be driven entirely by the need to communicate the script concept. Because of the fact that many people believe in the "high concept" idea, we would expect that writers seek to cut their descriptions short in hopes of increasing the probability of sale. variation in complexity does exist: the loglines in the entire dataset range from 2 to 96 words, with an average of 25. Clearly, brevity is not the only criterion that writers use in developing their pitches.
We suggest that these variations may be the result of a process that moves toward a "separating equilibrium" in the market for screenplays. Only "harder-information" scripts can be reduced to a few words without losing the ability to communicate the plot. For more complex concepts, a brief description will lose so much information as to render the pitch worthless. Thus, writers and agents will incur the "cost" of a longer pitch in order to signal the presence of a "softer", more complex plot line.
We gather data on the screenplay "pitch" or "logline," (the description used to sell the script) as well as screenwriter compensation, screenwriter experience, script complexity, and movie financials and We have a purchase price for 778 scripts (61.31% of the total sample). The purchase price may be an exact number (which we have for 224 scripts, 28.79% of scripts with available purchase price, 17.65% of the total sample). In other cases, Spec Screenplay Sales Directory may record an approximate price (554 scripts). This is generally recorded as, for example, mid-600's, or low 400's. In the latter case, we transform the price range into a best estimate (for instance, low five figures is transformed into $25,000;
17 Here are some examples of the additional information provided. The following comment was added to the description of the screenplay entitled "Kungfu Theater": "DreamWorks purchased project from Mandalay which bought it in September 2000 for six figures. " An example of information about the screenwriter's path to developing the screenplay is found in the comments on "Lightning" by Marc Platt: "The writer based screenplay on 1997 novel, 'A Gracious Plenty' which he optioned out of his own pocket. Writer is also a producer". The information may be tentative, e.g. regarding the script "Last Ride", it was noted that: "Ron Howard might direct." In other cases, the information is more definite, e.g. in the notes for the screenplay entitled "Mickey" we find that "Harry Connick Jr. is in talks to star; Hugh Wilson will direct". high six figures is transformed into $750,000).
18 Using these numbers and transformations, we analyze the data further.
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As discussed earlier, screenwriters may be offered two types of contracts. The first is a fixed payment, non-contingent contract. There are 299 such screenplays in our sample (38%). Alternatively, the screenwriter may be offered a contingent contract --489 of the scripts in our sample fit this description. (Note that there are 10 scripts for which we know the type of contract but not the price.) In a contingent contract the screenwriter receives an initial payment upon contract signing and an additional amount if the script is produced. Average compensation in non-contingent contracts is (in thousands) A screenplay, as we explained earlier, needs to pass several layers of approval. The logline is the first step in that process, and is widely regarded as a vital part of getting the project accepted by an agent and then a studio. 20 In order to assess the descriptive complexity, which, as we have suggested, indicates soft information content of the screenplay, we start with a simple measure, namely, the number of words in the logline (LogWords). 21 .
Out of 1,269 scripts, the Directory lists the logline for 1,218 scripts (95.98%). The average logline description contains 25.92 words (standard deviation is 13.65). Since the number of words is a rough approximation, and different types of descriptions require more or fewer words for the same level of complexity, we also created a coarse division to approximate the fundamental differences in complexity. SoftWords is an index variable which equals 0 if the logline contains up to 20 words; 1 if it contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if it contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if it contains more than 40 words 22 . When we want to emphasize the soft aspect of a description, we use the variable HighWords, a dummy that equals 1 is the logline contains more than 40 words (SoftWords = 3) and 0 otherwise. The logline may be just descriptive or may contain references to existing movies. Eighty-five scripts (6.98% of the scripts for which we have the storyline) mention at least one movie in the story line (56 mention one movie, 29 mention two movies). SoftLogMovies equals 1 if the logline refers to any other movie and zero otherwise. We assume that analogy or reference to other movies make the logline more transparent. Additional information is provided for 573 scripts, (45.15% of the sample). As discussed earlier, this information may make the script easier to interpret. We create a dummy variable for the availability of additional information (InfoDummy), which is equal to 1 if additional information is provided.
The discussion of soft information in the previous section should make it clear that soft information measures are bound to be noisy. Thus, even if we have the correct characterization, most of the action should probably be in the extreme cases. We create a very simple script complexity index,
TransparentScript, that equals 1 when the log line contains up to 20 words (i.e. SoftWords equals 0), and additional information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1). TransparentScript is equal to 1 for 227 scripts (17.9% of the sample).
Genres are commonly considered to be important variables in studies of films (for a recent example, see De Vany, 2004) . Four hundred and sixty five scripts (36.64% of the sample) are assigned more than one genre (453 are assigned two genres, 12 three genres). We group the different genres reported by Spec Screenplay Sales Directory into six broad categories: action (189 scripts), comedy (571 scripts), drama (257 scripts), romance (257 scripts), thriller (224 scripts), and other (123 scripts). Genres can be control variables (i.e. compensation may be higher for certain genres than for others), but can also serve as a measure of complexity, namely, if more than one genre is assigned to a screenplay, that may indicate more complexity and a higher component of soft information. SoftGenres equals one if the number of genres assigned to the script is at least 2 and zero otherwise.
The next set of variables describes our "hard information", namely, the screenwriter's experience and past success. 23 To measure screenwriter experience we search the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) for the number of scripts previously sold by the screenwriter and produced. If we find no entries, we also 22 We tried running a dummy variable for each range. As expected, results were similar. For purposes of sensitivity analysis, we also tried different ranges, where SoftWords received the value of zero for loglines under 15 words, and under 25 words respectively. There was very little difference in the empirical results, including runs with the changed transparent script variable (see below) and thus we did not include these specifications in our tables. 23 Clearly one can argue with definitions of hard and soft information. However, to our mind, external validation variables are at least as hard as past payment history in credit applications, which is a behavioral characteristic changeable at the applicant's will at any time. In any case, those variables are "harder" and more likely to be viewed the same way by different people (see Stein (2002) and Petersen (2004) ) than a description of a plot line. takes the value 1 if the screenwriter had been nominated for (had won) an Oscar prior to the current sale.
AnyNom (AnyAward) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter had been previously nominated for (had won)
an award in any of the major festivals tracked by imdb.com: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Awards, European Film Awards, and awards from the festivals of Cannes, Sundance, Toronto and Berlin. For 71 scripts, the screenwriter had been nominated in a major festival; in 32 cases, the screenwriter had previously won an award in a major festival; in 27 cases, s/he had been nominated for an Oscar; and for 10 scripts, the screenwriter had previously won an Oscar. Finally, an unknown screenwriter may use a manager to compensate for his lack of experience. Spec Screenplay Sales Directory reports that the screenwriters who wrote 172 of the scripts sold (13.55% of the total sample) employ a manager.
The Internet Movie Database (IMDb) reports all films produced or that are in production. 311 scripts (24.51% of the total sample) had been produced or were in production as of December, 2003. We chose that cut-off mostly because we wanted to have all the financial information for the films released (including ancillary sales.) However, it does point out which films tend to have a "fast track" to production. It is virtually certain that more screenplays will be produced in the future, especially from the most recent acquisitions 24 . Thus, although we do run a regression for the probability of being produced, we do not consider the results an important part of our analysis. On the other hand, we can certainly evaluate the projects produced and compare them to the screenplays that had generated them.
For each movie produced, we obtain financial performance figures from Baseline StudioSystems (blssi.com). Specifically, we have the budget of each film, domestic revenues, international revenues as well as video and DVD revenues. 25 We use two measures of return. One is total revenues over budget ("negative costs"), and the other is total revenues over budget plus advertising and promotion expenditures.
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For each film we obtain several additional control variables. MPAA ratings (in particular, family friendly ratings) have been shown to be a most important determinant of revenues and returns in a number of previous papers. 27 We obtain ratings for all films released. Interestingly, our sample of films produced tends to be somewhat skewed-there are no G-rated films, and more PG-13 than expected (see MPAA.org or Ravid (1999) for a discussion of the distribution of ratings). It seems that Grated films, and in general family films, which also tend to be the most successful (see Ravid (1999) January of the year the movie was released. Using the different reputation variables, we create dummies 26 In spite of industry wisdom, promotional expenditures are highly correlated with the budget (see Ravid and Basuroy, 2004) . Therefore the two indices are highly correlated. Although we do have rental numbers i.e. what the studio collects of the revenues, we do not have comparable numbers for home entertainment, where contracts are more complicated. Thus, for consistency, we use total revenues as a measure of income. Rentals are roughly half the revenues for theatrical exhibition, but not so for home entertainment revenues. 27 See for example, Ravid (1999) , Ravid and Basuroy (2004) Fee (2002) , DeVany and Walls (2002) or Simonoff and Sparrow (2000) . 28 The analysis of stardom goes back to the theory of Rosen (1981) and includes empirical work by Hamlen (1991) and Chung and Cox (1994) . Ravid (1999) , however, who considers specifically the movie industry, finds that star power is not a significant determinant of either revenues or return on investment. 29 We experimented with Starmeter rankings of the highest 50 or highest 100, but that did not change the qualitative results. None of these variables was significant. We measure critical opinion using the Crix Picks column in the publication Variety, which lists reviews for the first weekend in which a film opens in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. 31 The total number of reviews, Total Reviews proxies for the attention the movie receives 32 . In its Crix Picks column, Variety classifies reviews (based on critics' own assessments) as "pro", "con", or "mixed." We use these classifications to create consensus measures of critical opinion: Positive Reviews is the ratio of number of "pro" reviews divided by the total number of reviews. Non-Negative Reviews is the ratio of non-negative reviews (i.e., pro plus mixed) divided by the total number of reviews The next panel includes "soft information" variables. The results suggest that shorter ("high concept" in Hollywood lingo) loglines (SoftWords = 0) are associated with higher payments, and a lower probability of a contingent contract (here the separation is between 0 and 1 and 2 vs. 3). Similarly, screenplays that provide additional information are rewarded for it, and a "transparent script", which is a composite of the two measures, is worth more than a "non-transparent" one. Genres (panel D) may play a role, but the role is unclear from the tabulation above. The means and the medians of our variables tell a similar story. In panel E we consider the variability of prices of screenplays with more or less soft 30 Continuing with our example, Cast Dummy Awarded Oscar takes the value one for the film The 25 th Hour, since one of the film's cast members, Anna Paquin, received an Academy Award in 1994 for her role in the film The Piano. 31 In the earlier years of our sample, reviews from Washington, D.C. were also included and we include these as well when they are present. Their numbers are generally small. We do not include the reviews from London, where movies do not generally open at the same time as in American cities. 32 Ravid (1999) found that the total reviews variable significantly affected movie performance in his sample. 33 In Ravid (1999) only the total number of reviews mattered. However, Eliashberg and Shugan (1997) as well as Basuroy et al. (2003) found that reviews significantly affect the weekly revenues. 34 For convenience, all variables are described in appendix A.
information. We find that the distribution of prices of "softer" screenplays is more variable, supporting the characterization of "softness" as a risk factor.
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In summary, the first five panels of Table I seem to suggest that soft and hard information variables are priced in the manner we hypothesized and that they are important in determining the type of contract offered to a screenwriter.
The last three panels of Table I test The second group (Small) contains those screenplays bought by any other company among the more than 500 buyers in our data set. 37 We repeat the mean and median calculations from Panels A and B for each group separately. Panel F shows the results for each group separately and the differences of means and medians. Panel G shows only the differences. We performed t tests for the differences of the means and the significant results are indicated in these panels.
We find that in almost every category, the "Large" studios pay higher prices for screenplays and perhaps surprisingly, offer more contingent contracts.
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In many cases, these differences are statistically significant (Panel F). If the hierarchical structure of a large company leads to difficulties in making judgments based on soft information, then contingent contracts may be beneficial. This finding is consistent with the banking literature. 39 We test this idea further, by looking at the relative prices paid for "harder" screenplays. Specifically, in panel G we compare ratios between prices paid by large studios and small studios as the availability of hard information increases. We find that large studios pay relatively more for hard information. In other words, the large studios are not only paying more for everything, but are willing to pay a premium for hard information. This further confirms the analogy to the banking papers 40 35 We thank Mitch Petersen for suggesting this test. 36 These six are listed on the home page of the Association at www.mpaa.org. 37 We did the same tests using an expanded set of 17 studios for the Large set, taken from the data used in Einav 2006). The results were similar. 38 This effect is also reflected in the regressions in Tables II and III , where the LargeStudio dummy variable is always positive and usually significant. 39 We further divided the Large group into those screenplays bought by the large studio alone, and those bought by the large studio in partnership with a smaller studio. Comparing the same means for these two subgroups gives similar results. The partnerships with smaller studios are analogous to a large bank having smaller branches or subsidiaries closer to the customers or having a decentralized organization, as described by Stein (2002) . The large buyers alone use more hard information, while in partnerships with small studios, they may be able to make better use of the soft information. 40 The one exception is for RepnMovies = 3, where the small studios pay more than the large studios. This anomaly results from a category with only seven data points, two of which are outliers.
To see the combined effect on screenplay prices of studio size and both hard and soft information, we create overall indices of hard and soft information. The hard information index is HardIndex = RepnMovies + AnyNom, with a value between 0 and 4. Low hard information is defined as HardIndex = 0 and high hard information is defined as HardIndex > 0. The soft information index is SoftIndex = SoftWords + SoftGenres + (1-InfoDummy) + (1-SoftLogMovies) with a value between 0 and 6. Low soft information is defined as SoftIndex < 3 and high soft information is defined as SoftIndex > 2. 41 We compare the "hardest" movies, those with high hard information and low soft information content, to the "softest", those with low hard information and high soft information content for "Large" and "Small" studios. The results are shown in Panel H of Table I . For the high-hard, low-soft group, that is, the "hardest" screenplays, the large-small difference of average prices paid is significant, and the large/small ratio is 1.57. For the "softest" group, the difference is not significant and the ratio is 1.15. Again, we see that the "large" studios may pay more in both cases, but they pay relatively more for harder screenplays and relatively less for softer ones.
The remaining tables present regressions testing the relationship between soft information, compensation and deal structure. 42 Table II reports a regression in which the dependent variable is the price paid in either contingent or non-contingent contracts. For contingent contracts, the dependent variable is the price paid if the movie is not made, that is, upfront. In the case of non-contingent contracts, we use the price actually paid. The results seem to confirm the findings in the means tests.
In all regression specifications, experience variables, such as the number of films the screenwriter had written, or nominations for major awards, (which are our "hard information" variables) are positive and significant. Soft information variables, such as SoftWords (a dummy) and LogWords (which counts the number of words) have the right sign (negative) but are not significant. If we split the sample into all screenplays vs. the "softest of the soft" i.e. first time writers with longer loglines, (Logwords x FirstMovie) it is significant at 5% or more supporting the idea that if you are inexperienced and you provide a "soft" screenplay, you will be punished.
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TransparentScript, which describes screenplays with additional information and for which the log line contains less than 20 words is most significant. The lower is the "soft information" content, as measured by TransparentScript, the higher is the price. As a rough estimate, we can say that having sold a previous movie (NumberMovies) increases the price received by about 50,000 dollars. here as well, large studios pay more. 44 We also ran regressions for the non-contingent contracts. Results were similar.
Table III presents a regression in which the dependent variable is the initial compensation in contingent contracts. We should recall that this specification is most important for our thesis--as we have seen in Table I and as is confirmed later, contingent contracts are awarded to less experienced writers.
Thus, here we would expect soft information to matter most, as it indeed does. HighWords (defined as 1
if LogWords > 40 and 0 otherwise) is negative and significant in most regressions. Here again, the interaction variables generally have the right sign, and are often significant, including those with soft genres (cases in which more than one genre is assigned to the screenplay). This again supports the idea that soft information is viewed as a risk factor which lowers prices.
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Table IV speaks to the contract design question and presents a probit regression estimating the likelihood of receiving a contingent contract. We find that writers are less likely to receive a contingent
contract if they have sold more screenplays (NumberMovies). Complexity is represented by the variable
HighWords. It significantly increases the probability of receiving a contingent contract. This supports our earlier conjecture that "iffier" projects tend to be sold on a contingency basis. Thrillers and comedies seem to be less likely to result in contingent contracts. We are not sure why. 46 The finding that reputation matters, is similar to Banerjee and Duflo (2000) or Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) , although their setting is very different.
There is an interesting contrast between this result and the findings of Chisholm (1997).
Chisholm discusses the probability that actors receive a share contract (as opposed to fixed compensation). She finds that more experienced actors are, if anything, the more likely they are to receive contingent contracts, supporting the Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1992) ideas that more incentives are needed closer to the end of the life cycle. However, in our case there are no effort issues. The contract design must address only risk sharing and different assessments of future prospects. Similar to Banerjee and Duflo (2000) we do not seem to find much evidence for risk 44 We repeated all specifications (not reported), with the addition of a Large_studio dummy variable. In all cases this variable was significant and positive, again confirming that large studios pay higher prices for screenplays. 45 Again, we repeated all specifications (not reported), with the addition of a Large_studio dummy variable. In all cases this variable was significant and positive. 46 We repeated all specifications (not reported), with the addition of a Large_studio dummy variable. In all cases this variable was positive, but not statistically significant. These results are consistent with large studios using a larger proportion of contingent contracts.
sharing. Rather, as argued, there may indeed be asymmetric information or behaviorally different assessments of risk.
47
In summary, the results so far suggest that screenplay prices and contract design are heavily dependent on both the identity of the writer as well as the soft information contained in the description of the project, even at the point of sale, complementing the findings by Eliashberg et al. (2007) .We also show that continent contracts are more likely for less experienced writers and for more complex scripts.
In Table V , we report a probit regression estimating the probability of a screenplay being produced. Since it sometimes takes several years or more in development for a screenplay to become a movie, and since our last screenplay was sold in 2002, we have a right-truncation of the data. However, the results do seem to suggest that screenplays by experienced writers have an edge (or perhaps are produced faster). Similarly, low experience interacted with soft information seem to delay production. In other words, the lower price paid for low experience high soft information screenplays may be justified and there appears to be a lower probability of such screenplays making it to the big screen. We also looked at the percentage of films produced for "large" and "small" studios, according to our different definitions. "Small" studios rushed 23% of the screenplays to production while "large" studios only made about 20% of the screenplays into movies. It is not a big difference but it is consistent with the interpretation that "large" studios are more decentralized and take longer to evaluate projects.
We turn next to examine the role of soft information in the success or failure of movies that are actually produced, and in the process, we are able to consider whether the first-stage (screenplay) pricing makes economic sense.
Screenplay prices and the success of films
The distribution of movie releases from our sample is somewhat skewed compared to a random sample -there are no G-rated movies, and there are fewer PG-rated movies, fewer R-rated movies and more PG-13-rated movies than in a random sample, (see Ravid, 1999 , and MPAA.org). As noted, it seems that the most profitable family movies tend to be developed in house, rather than purchased from outside screenwriters (see Palia et al. 2007 ). Also, films based on scripts by first time screenwriters have lower budgets, as expected. Indeed, all of the financial numbers are lower for the first movies, although the differences are not statistically significant. However, the rates of return for the two groups are similar.
Interestingly, the reviews for films based upon "better" screenwriters' work are worse than average and worse than reviews of films based upon screenplays of first time writers 48 .
47 Blumenthal (1988) , in a similar framework, analyzes contracts between exhibitors and distributors. Different behavior is predicted and observed in the case of "blind" bidding for films vs. bidding for films that are previewed. 48 Detailed tables are available from the authors.
In the next set of regressions, we run revenues (domestic, international, video and DVD as well as total revenues and rate of return) against control variables and the price paid for the screenplay. 49 We only report revenue regressions where the dependent variable is total revenues in Table VI . The control variables that are significant are similar to those that mattered in other work -namely, budget and reviews. 50 The star status of the cast does not make a difference (see Ravid, 1999 , for similar results on a different sample, as well as De Vany, 2004). PG-13 films are better than R-rated films (our default).
However, the revenues of PG-rated films are not significantly different from those of R-rated films. It may be that the small number of PG-rated films contributes to that result--in the means comparisons PGrated films were better performers, consistent with most other studies of the film industry (see Ravid, 1999, Ravid and Basuroy, 2004.) .
However, perhaps the most interesting finding, which supports the thrust of the argument in Eliashberg et al. (2007) is the role of the price paid for screenplays. The price variable is positive and significant in regressions for the whole sample and for the subset with non-contingent contracts. This is consistent with the idea that the industry is able to effectively process soft and hard information and make rational economic decisions 51 . The fact that prices are not correlated with revenues for contingent contracts is consistent with the idea that these are the "softer" screenplays, and hence harder to judge.
Results are similar for other revenue components (not reported). Perhaps most interesting is the rate of return regression (Table VII) . The dependent variable is the total revenues divided by total costs (production costs plus promotion and advertising) 52 . The control variables that matter vary (see Ravid, 1999) . However, the rate of return increases significantly with the price paid both in the entire sample and for non-contingent contracts. This means that more expensive screenplays not only increase revenues, but actually increase profitability. A large production budget, on the other hand, seems to have a significant positive effect on revenues, while it has a negative but insignificant effect on profitability in most specifications. 53 This negative effect appears in other studies as well and is often significant (see for example Ravid (1999) , John et al. (2007) ). Again, for contingent contracts the price is insignificant but good reviews matter, supporting the idea that these are indeed the "softer" screenplays, which are easier 49 See Ravid (1999) and Ravid and Basuroy (2004) for a discussion of the methodology. 50 We use a dummy variable for years before 2000 because there was a significant drop in the total number of reviews for all movies around that time. 51 There is of course a selection bias in the set of films produced-they may be the "better" screenplays. However, our results suggest that within this group, higher prices for the screenplay are correlated with a higher rate of return on the film. 52 The results and the measures are somewhat different from Eliashberg et al. (2007) -in that paper revenues include US theatrical revenues whereas we include revenues from all sources. 53 The budget does have a slightly significant and positive effect on the rate of return for movies whose scripts were purchased with contingent contracts. Perhaps these movies, often from less experienced screenwriters, need more production expenditures and promotion to be successful.
to evaluate only after production is completed. Perhaps those are the ones which can benefit most from extensive textual analysis as suggested in Eliashberg et al. (2007) .
V VI I. . C CO ON NC CL LU US SI IO ON NS S
Aesthetic evaluation is central to the film industry. However, despite the message of the annual Academy Awards ceremony, the industry does not make art for art's sake -it processes complex inputs from many different fields of art with the ultimate goal of making a profit.
Our major findings highlight the dual role of soft and hard information in the pricing of intellectual property. The screenwriter's experience and past success, which can be easily expressed in measurable terms, are very important, and increase the prices paid for screenplays. However, the presence of soft information, as indicated by our proxies, depresses prices. That is, screenplays characterized in "softer" terms--particularly if they are written by lesser-known writers--command substantially lower prices. These results are consistent conceptually with findings in the banking industry and they complement Eliashberget al. (2007) by suggesting that even at the point of sale, semantic analysis is what matters most to the pricing of screenplays. We also find that large organizations tend to shun soft information, supporting the theory and empirical analysis of the banking industry.
Various manifestations of soft information are shown to increase the probability of a contingent contract. This suggests that contingent contracts may allow contracting in an environment where uncertainty and asymmetric information interact. However, reputation increases the probability of receiving cash upfront.
In the second part of the paper we link the economic performance of films with screenplay characteristics. We find that pricing is efficient, even in an industry with a complex production function relying fundamentally on soft information. . This finding certainly contradicts the view that production decisions are arbitrary and ill informed ("nobody knows anything".)
A AP PP PE EN ND DI IX X A A: : V VA AR RI IA AB BL LE E D DE EF FI IN NI IT TI IO ON NS S Soft Information -Script Complexity Variables
• LogWords counts the number of words in the script logline.
• SoftWords equals 0 if the script logline contains up to 20 words; 1 if it contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if it contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if it contains more than 40 words.
• HighWords equals 1 if the script logline contains more than 40 words (SoftWords = 3) and 0 otherwise.. • InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available.
• TransparentScript is a script complexity index that equals 1 when the logline contains up to 20 words (i.e. SoftWords equals 0), and additional information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1).
• SoftGenres equals 1 if the qualified number of genres is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise.
• SoftLogmovies equals 1 if the script's logline refers to any other movie, and 0 otherwise.
• SoftIndex = SoftWords + SoftGenres + (1-InfoDummy) + (1-SoftLogMovies) with a value betwen 0 and 6. Soft information data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory.
Hard Information Variables
• NumberMovies is the number of scripts previously sold by the script's screenwriter.
• ReputationMovies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 4 and 10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter has previously sold more than 10 scripts.
• First Movie takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise.
• Nom Oscar (AwardOscar) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated for (won) an Oscar.
• AnyNom (AnyAward) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated for an award in one of the following festivals and competitions: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European Film Award, Cannes, Sundance, Toronto, Berlin.
• Cast Nominated Oscar (Awarded Oscar, Any Nomination, Any Award): For each movie, we gather the total number of Oscar and major festival nominations and awards for the entire cast.
• Cast Dummy Nominated Oscar (Awarded Oscar, Any Nomination, Any Award): We then create a set of dummy variables that equal one if any cast member is defined as a star for each star definition.
• Starmeter uses proprietary algorithms that take into account several measures of popularity for people and titles. The primary measure captures who or what is being viewed on the public imdb.com website. Other factors include box office receipts and user quality votes on a scale of 1-10. The rankings are updated on a weekly basis. We classify an actor as a star if he or she has a Starmeter ranking higher than 150 in the first entry in January of the year the movie is released. Our Starmeter variable counts for each film (similar to other cast reputation variables), the total number of cast members who were classified as stars in January of the year the movie was released.
• HardIndex = RepnMovies + AnyNom, with a value between 0 and 4. Reputation variables data are from IMDb.
Compensation -Contractual Variables
• Price reflects the payment made to the screenwriter when he sells the script. In non-contingent contracts, the screenwriter compensation is fixed (i.e. the screenwriter compensation does not depend on whether the movie is produced or not). In contingent contracts, Price reflects the screenwriter compensation when the movie is not produced. All prices are adjusted from the purchase date to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
• Cont is a dummy variable that equals 0 if the screenwriter's compensation is fixed; that is, the screenwriter receives a certain salary regardless of whether the movie is produced or not. The variable equals 1 when the contract is contingent and compensation is structured in two steps: the screenwriter receives a certain amount for selling the script; and additional payment if the movie is actually made.
• Produced is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the script has been produced or is in production, and 0 otherwise.
Movie Financial Variables
• All financial data (revenues and costs) are adjusted from the release date to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
• Total Revenues is the sum of Domestic Gross, Foreign Gross, Domestic Video Gross and Domestic DVD Gross.
• Rate1 equals Total Revenues divided by Negative Costs (budget).
• Rate2 equals Total Revenues divided by Negative Costs plus Domestic Print and Advertising Costs.
Additional Control Variables
• GenreDummies: Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the "Action" (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Other is 1 when all the others are 0.
• Manager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a manager, and 0 otherwise.
• MPAA ratings: We obtain ratings for all films released. Interestingly, our sample of films produced tends to be somewhat skewed -there are no G rated films, and more PG-13 than expected.
• Variety Reviews. Each reviewer included in Variety's "Crix Picks" column grades the movie as positive, negative, or mixed. Positive Reviews equals the ratio between positive reviews and total reviews. Non-negative Reviews equals the ratio between positive plus mixed reviews and total reviews. Total Reviews equals the total number of reviews. (0,1) , the T-Test is used for equality of means. For variables with more than two values and for all medians, the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test is used for the equality of two or more medians. The last two columns analyze how screenwriter reputation and script complexity influence the type of contract offered to the screenwriter, as well as the probability that the script is ultimately produced. Compensation variables include the price (in thousands of 2003 dollars) paid to the screenwriter (Price); which is either the price paid in non-contingent contracts or the initial price paid in contingent contracts; Cont is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the screenwriter is offered a contingent contract (i.e. a contract in which compensation depends on whether the movie is ultimately produced or not). Produced is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the movie is produced and 0, otherwise. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. ReputationMovies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 4 and 10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter has previously sold more than 10 scripts. FirstMovie takes the value one if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and zero otherwise. NomOscar (AwardOscar) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has previously been nominated for (won) an Oscar. AnyNom (AnyAward) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has previously been nominated (won) for an award in the following festivals: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European Film Award, Cannes, Sundance, Toronto, Berlin. We also include several variables that try to capture soft information or script complexity. SoftWords equals 0 if the script logline contains up to 20 words; 1 if it contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if it contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if it contains more than 40 words. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available. We create a script complexity index, TransparentScript, that equals 1 when the log line contains up to 20 words (i.e. SoftWords equals 0), and additional information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ). The genre variables are dummy variables: Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the ŅActionÓ (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Other is 1 if the other five genre variables are all 0, and 0 otherwise. Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies have been produced is from IMDB. Panel E shows that the set of movies with high soft information has a much higher variability of prices. Panels F and G give the same statistics as Panels A and B respectively, but with the movies divided into two groups: those bought by 6 of the largest studios and those bought by other studios. Panel F shows each group separately and the differences of the means and ratios of mean prices in each category. Panel G shows only the differences of the means and ratios of mean prices. Panel H shows mean prices for large and small studios in groups that have the most hard information and least soft or the most soft information and the least hard and the large-tosmall ratios. The defintion of high and low hard (soft) information is based on an index formed by adding several of the hard (soft) information variables. Details of the index definitions are given in the text. The asterisks in the difference panels indicate the significance of t tests for the means of the two groups being different. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels for the t and Kruskal-Wallis tests. , reflects the payment made to the screenwriter when he sells the script. In non-contingent contracts, the screenwriter compensation is fixed (i.e. it does not depend on whether the movie is produced or not). In contingent contracts, Price reflects the screenwriter compensation when the movie is not made. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. NumberMovies measures the number of scripts previously sold by the scriptÕsscreenwriter. ReputationMovies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 4 and 10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter has previously sold more than 10 scripts. FirstMovie takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise. NomOscar takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated for an Oscar. AnyNom takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated for an award in the following festivals: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European Film Award, Cannes, Sundance, Toronto, Berlin. We also include several variables that try to capture soft information or script complexity. LogWords counts the number of words in the script logline. SoftWords equals 0 if the script logline contains up to 20 words; 1 if the script logline contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if the script logline contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if the script logline contains more than 40 words. SoftLogMovies is 1 if the logline mentions at least one other movie and 0 otherwise. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available. We create a script complexity index, Transparent Script, that equals 1 when the logline contains up to 20 words (i.e. SoftWords equals 0), and additional information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ). LargeStudio is a dummy variable for the buyer of the screensplay being one of the six largest studios. The genre and agency variables are dummy variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the ŅActionÓ (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Manager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a manager, and 0 otherwise. e create interaction variables for soft low reputation -soft information. These variables, identified by FirstMovie * variable, take the value of the relevant soft information variable if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise. Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies have been produced is from IMDB. t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. This table reports OLS estimates of initial compensation in contingent contracts (i.e. contracts in which the screenwriter compensation depends on whether the movie is produced or not) on a set of variables that measure screenwriter reputation, script complexity, movie genre and agency relationships. The dependent variable, Price (in thousands of 2003 dollars), measures the initial payment that the screenwriter receives in a contingent contract. If the movie is not produced, the screenwriter does not receive any additional compensation. When the movie is produced, the screenwriter is paid an additional fee. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. NumberMovies measures the number of scripts previously sold by the scriptÕsscreenwriter. Reputation Movies takes the value 0 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 1 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 1 and 3 scripts; 2 if the screenwriter has previously sold between 4 and 10 scripts; and 3 if the screenwriter has previously sold more than 10 scripts. First Movie takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise. We also include several variables that try to capture soft information or script complexity. LogWords is the number of words in the script's logline (brief description). SoftWords equals 0 if the script logline contains up to 20 words; 1 if the script logline contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if the script logline contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if the script logline contains more than 40 words. LogMovies is the number of other movies mentioned in the script's logline. SoftLogMovies equals 1 if the script's logline refers to any other movie, and 0 otherwise. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available. SoftGenres equals 1 if the qualified number of genres is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. HighWords is 1 if the script's logline has more than 40 words (SoftWords = 3), and 0 otherwise. LargeStudio is a dummy variable for the buyer of the screensplay being one of the six largest studios. The genre and agency variables are dummy variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the ŅActionÓ (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Manager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a manager, and 0 otherwise. We create interaction variables for soft low reputation -soft information. These variables, identified by FirstMovie * variable, take the value of the relevant soft information variable if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise. Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies has been produced is from IMDB. This table reports probit estimates of the type of contract offered to the screenwriter depending on a set of variables that measure screenwriter reputation, script complexity, movie genre and agency relationships. The dependent variable, Cont, is a dummy variable that equals 0 if the screenwriterÕscompensation is fixed; that is, the screenwriter receives certain salary regardless of whether the movie is produced or not. The variable equals 1 when compensation is structured in two steps: the screenwriter receives a certain amount for selling the script; and additional payment if the movie is actually made. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. NumberMovies measures the number of scripts previously sold by the scriptÕsscreenwriter. FirstMovie takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 0 if the screenwriter has previously sold at least one script. We also include several variables that try to capture soft information or script complexity. SoftLogMovies equals 1 if the script's logline refers to any other movie, and otherwise. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available. We create a script complexity index, Transparent Script, that equals 1 when the log line contains up to 20 words, and additional information about the script is available (i.e. InfoDummy equals 1 ). Soft_Genres equals 1 if the qualified number of genres is greater than 1, and otherwise. HighWords is 1 if the number of words in the logline is greater than 40 and 0 otherwise. LargeStudio is a dummy variable for the buyer of the screensplay being one of the six largest studios. The genre and agency variables are dummy variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the ŅActionÓ (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Note that more than one of these genre variables may have the value 1. Manager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a manager, and 0 otherwise. Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies has been produced is from IMDB. This table reports probit estimates of the decision to produce the movie or not depending on a set of variables that measure screenwriter reputation, script complexity, movie genre and agency relationships. The dependent variable, Produced, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the script has been produced or is in production, and 0 otherwise. We include several screenwriter reputation variables. NumberMovies measures the number of scripts previously sold by the scriptÕsscreenwriter. FirstMovie takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script; 0 otherwise. NomOscar (AwardOscar) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated for (won) an Oscar. AnyNom (AnyAward) takes the value 1 if the screenwriter has been previously nominated (won) for an award in the following festivals: Oscars, Golden Globes, British Academy Awards, Emmy Award, European Film Award, Cannes, Sundance, Toronto, Berlin. We also include several variables that try to capture soft information or script complexity. LogWords counts the number of words in the script logline (brief description). SoftWords equals 0 if the script logline contains up to 20 words; 1 if it contains between 21 and 30 words; 2 if it contains between 31 and 40 words; and 3 if it contains more than 40 words. InfoDummy equals 1 if additional information about the script is available, 0 otherwise. SoftGenres equals 1 if the qualified number of genres is greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. The genre and agency variables are dummy variables. Action (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) takes the value 1 if the script is classified in the ŅActionÓ (Comedy, Drama, Romance, Thriller) category by Spec Screenplay Directory, and 0 otherwise. Note that more than one of these variables may have th value 1. Manager takes the value of 1 if the screenwriter has a manager, and 0 otherwise. We create interaction variables for soft low reputation -soft information. These variables, identified by FirstMovie * variable, take the value of the relevant soft information variable if the screenwriter has not previously sold any script, and 0 otherwise. Compensation, soft information and type of contract data are from the Spec Screenplay Sales Directory. Reputation variables and information regarding whether the movies has been produced is from IMDB. This table reports the OLS estimates of the regression of total revenues on screenwriter compensation, and a set of control variables that includes movie reviews and cast reputation. All financial data is CPI-adjusted from the year of movie release to thousands of 2003 dollars, except for the script price, which is adjusted from the year of the script sale. Total Revenues equals Domestic Gross, Foreign Gross, Domestic Video Gross and Domestic DVD Gross.regression of domestic gross revenues on screenwriter compensation, and a set of control variables that includes movie reviews and cast reputation. The first two columns report estimates for our sample of produced scripts for which Baseline FT gathers financial data. Columns three and four are restricted to scripts in which a non-contingent contract is offered to the screenwriter. Columns five and six are restricted to scripts in which a contingent contract is offered to the screenwriter and the compensation measure used is the intial payment made to the screenwriter.. For each film we gather Variety Reviews. Each Variety reviewer grades the movie as positive, negative, or mixed. Positive Review Fraction is the fraction of all reviews that are positive. Non-negative Review Fraction is the fraction of all reviews that are positive or mixed. Total Reviews is the total number of reviews. Before2000 is a dummy variable that is 1 for years before 2000 and 0 otherwise. It is used because there was a significant drop in the total number of reviews for all movies around that time. For each movie, we gather several measures of cast reputation: the total number of Oscar and major festival nominations and awards for the entire cast. We then create a set of dummy variables that equal one if any cast member is defined as a star for each star definition. Starmeter measures cast reputation following the opinion of IMDb readers. We classify as a star any actor/actress who in the January prior to the film's release has a starmeter rating below 150. t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels This table reports the OLS estimates of the regression of the films rate of return on screenwriter compensation, and a set of control variables that includes movie reviews and cast reputation. All financial data is CPI-adjusted from the year of movie release to thousands of 2003 dollars, except for the script price, which is adjusted from the year of the script sale. Rate of return is defined as the ratio between total revenues and negative costs plus print and advertisements costs (Rate2 in previous tables). Thgression of domestic gross revenues on screenwriter compensation, and a set of control variables that includes movie reviews and cast reputation. The first two columns report estimates for our sample of produced scripts for which Baseline FT gathers financial data. Columns three and four are restricted to scripts in which a non-contingent contract is offered to the screenwriter. Columns five and six are restricted to scripts in which a contingent contract is offered to the screenwriter and the compensation measure used is the intial payment made to the screenwriter.. For each film we gather Variety Reviews. Each Variety reviewer grades the movie as positive, negative, or mixed. Positive Review Fraction is the fraction of all reviews that are positive. Non-negative Review Fraction is the fraction of all reviews that are positive or mixed. Total Reviews is the total number of reviews. Before2000 is a dummy variable that is 1 for years before 2000 and 0 otherwise. It is used because there was a significant drop in the total number of reviews for all movies around that time. For each movie, we gather several measures of cast reputation: the total number of Oscar and major festival nominations and awards for the entire cast. We then create a set of dummy variables that equal one if any cast member is defined as a star for each star definition. Starmeter measures cast reputation following the opinion of IMDb readers. We classify as a star any actor/actress who in the January prior to the film's release has a starmeter rating below 150. tstatistics are in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels
